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Abst ract - -The  structure of the Electoral College based U.S. Presidential e ections system suggests 
a certain approach to choosing campaign strategies by U.S. Presidential candidates, and problems 
associated with finding competitive strategies ofthe candidates are considered. Most of the problems 
are formulated as discrete mathematical programming ones or as those with mixed variables, whereas 
some of the problems are formulated as game ones. Approaches tosolving all the considered problems 
with the use of both widely available and experimental software are proposed. Q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. 
All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Presidential elections system is unique and very logically designed although rather 
complicated for understanding in depth [1]. From the author's viewpoint, this system has not 
been studied to a degree allowing one to understand, in particular, how quantitative regularities 
embedded in the system affect campaigns of U.S. Presidential candidates. Only a few publications 
address some of these problems and propose certain approaches to their solving in particular 
cases (however, mostly, when only two candidates really compete in the race) [2-5]. At the same 
time, the Electoral College mechanism proposed by the Founding Fathers in the form similar to 
that used in the Centurial Assembly system of the Roman Republic [6] immediately suggests a
manner in which U.S. Presidential candidates may design their campaigns. Namely, according to 
the U.S. Constitution, each of 51 places (states and the District of Columbia (DC)) appoints a 
part icular number of the electors, and this number is subject to corrections every ten years [7]. 
The " winner-take-all" principle determines a manner in which a U.S. Presidential candidate who 
receives a plural ity of the popular vote in each of the states (except for Maine and Nebraska) and 
in DC is awarded the whole number of the electoral votes which each such state or DC appoints 
in the election [8]. To win a particular U.S. Presidential election in the Electoral College, the 
successful candidate must receive a major ity of the whole number of the electoral votes that are 
in play in the election. Currently, such a number does not exceed 538, and the above-mentioned 
major i ty can vary depending on this number. 
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It is clear that winning a plurality of the popular vote in a particular state and DC implies 
extensively campaigning there, which requires monetary and time resources. It is natural to 
assume that these resources are limited for each U.S. Presidential candidate in each U.S. Pres- 
idential election. So it is expedient o solve a problem of finding such combinations of states 
and DC the winning of the electoral votes in which secures the winning of the election in the 
Electoral College for a particular U.S. Presidential candidate while the total amounts of both 
resources fall within the limits existing for the candidate. Such a problem is easily formulated as 
a discrete optimization one of a particular kind, namely, as a Boolean knapsack problem (with 
an additional constraint) [9,10], and its solution determines possible ways of designing campaigns 
for U.S. Presidential candidates. 
It turns out that this problem is not the only one which U.S. Presidential candidates' teams 
could be interested to consider; however, even this problem appears in several modifications. In 
particular, as long as winning a plurality of the popular vote in each state and DC can, generally, 
be attained only with a certain probability, approaches to allocating the resources depending on 
such probabilities for the states and DC are also expedient to consider. 
The present article addresses the above-mentioned problems, along with others relevant o 
them, and suggests mathematical models for a formalized analysis of all the considered problems, 
as well as approaches to solving these problems. In all considerations throughout the article, for 
the sake of simplicity, we use current values of some parameters of the U.S. Presidential elections 
system. In particular, we assume that, for instance, the total number of the electoral votes that 
are in play in the election under consideration equals 538, and no stipulations on this matter are 
further made. 
2. PROBLEMS OF  ALLOCATING MONETARY 
AND T IME RESOURCES IN  CAMPAIGNS 
OF  U .S .  PRES IDENTIAL  CANDIDATES 
Let A1, A2, A3 be subsets of numbers from the set of natural numbers H = {1, 2, . . . ,  51}, such 
that A1 t2 As U A3 = H and A1 n As = ~, A1 C? Aa = O, A2 n A3 = ~. It is further assumed 
that each number from 1 through 50 is attributed to only one of the fifty states so that different 
states are attributed ifferent numbers, whereas the number 51 is attributed to the District of 
Columbia. 
Throughout this article, A1 means a set of places (states and DC) in which a particular U.S. 
Presidential candidate (the candidate further in the article) believes that he or she can afortiori 
win all the electoral votes that are in play there in a particular U.S. Presidential election, A2 
means a set of places (states and DC) in which that candidate cannot win the electoral votes in 
the election (from his or her viewpoint), and A3 means a set of the so-called "toss-up" places 
(states and DC) in which the candidate has, eventually, a chance to win the electoral votes [5]. 
It is convenient to call states and DC places, meaning parts of the country which are entitled 
to appoint he electors, in order to avoid repeatedly distinguishing the states and the District of 
Columbia in the reasoning to follow in this article. 
Further, let [5] 
x~ be equal 1 if place i is included in a combination of the places, and be equal 0, 
otherwise, i C H, 
a~ be the number of the electoral votes that place i appoints in a particular election 
year, 
13 be the minimal number of the electoral votes to be won in places forming the subset 
A3 in order to win the U.S. Presidential election in the Electoral College so that 
t 3 _< rn 3, where rn 3 = 270, 
m 3 - 13 be the number of the electoral votes secured for the candidate in places forming the 
set A1 in the election, 
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p~ be the amount of money to be invested by the candidate's team in campaigning in
place i in order to win all the electoral votes in place i, 
ti be the amount of time to be spent for campaigning in place i in order to win all the 
electoral votes there, 
p be the total amount of money available to the candidate in the campaign, 
t be the total amount of time within which the candidate's campaign can be con- 
ducted, 
p3 be the amount of money available for campaigning in places from the set A3, 
t a be the amount of time available for campaigning in places from the set A3. 
It is assumed that the necessary amounts of money and time, p - pa and t - t 3, respectively, 
are spent for campaigning in places forming the set A1 for the candidate, as well as nationwide, 
according to a certain schedule, so the allocation of the monetary and time resources is sought 
only among places forming the set A3. However, the candidate's team may, eventually, decide to 
consider A3 coinciding with H or make calculations for several versions of the set A3. 
As shown in the book [511 , problems of 
(a) finding whether the amount of money available for campaigning in places from the set Aa 
is sufficient for winning at least I a electoral votes there, 
(b) finding the minimal additional amount of money to be raised in order to secure the winning 
of at least l a electoral votes in places from the set A3 (if the amount p3 is not sufficient 
to do that), and 
(c) fining in which places the candidate's campaign should be concentrated in order to win 
at least I a electoral votes 
can be formulated as two-dimensional knapsack problems with an additional constraint and a 
particular mathematical programming problem with mixed variables. 
As is assumed in [5], money is a more important resource than time that the candidate has 
throughout he last day of the election campaign. However, it is clear that, formally, both 
resources, money and time, can be treated as equally important ones in the sense that increasing 
the amount of either resource to be spent for the campaigning is equally undesirable. 
It is further assumed that the system of inequalities 
E ai2ci > 13, 
iEA3 (1) 
xi E {0,1},  i EA3cH,  
has feasible solutions [5], which is easily verified by substituting 1 for all xi, i E A3 and comparing 
two natural numbers ~ied3 ai and I a. 
Let us consider the system of inequalities 
E aixi ~ 13~ 
iEA3 
p~x~ <_ pa + ~, (2) 
iEA3 
E tiX i < + V, t 3 
iCAa 
xi E {0, 1}, i E Aa C H, 1 a _< 270, u,v E R~_, 
which under the made assumptions, always has feasible solutions. 
The problem 
z --* min, 
under the constraints 
u-p3z  <_ O, z E R~,  
v - t3z <_ 0 
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and (2), where z can be interpreted as a percent of the increase of each of the two resources, 
should be solved in order to find the allocation of the resources under the compromise increase 
of the amounts of both resources. This problem is the one with mixed variables, and software 
implementing various techniques for solving this problem is widely available [11]. 
Let us now assume that the system of inequalities 
a~xi > l a, 
iEAa 
_< t 3, (3) 
iEA~ 
xi E {0,1}, i C A3 C H, 13 _< 270, 
is compatible for certain numbers to i E A3 C H. When the numbers p~, i c Aa C H are not 
known, whereas the inequalities of the kind 
ci <_ pi <_ di, ci, di E RI+ i E A3 C H, 
E Pi >_ q3, p3 < q3 q3 E R 1, 
icA3 
(4) 
hold, the problem of finding a feasible solution to the system of inequalities 
may need to be solved. 
variables 
E aixi >_ 13, 
iEA3 
E pixi <_ pa 
(5) 
Z t~x~ <_ t 3, 
iEA3 
xi E {0, 1}, i C A3 C H, 13 _< 270, 
Solving this problem is reducible to solving the problem with mixed 
u ---* min, 
E aixi >_ 13, 
lEA3 
E p~x~ <_ p3 + u, 
iEAa 
~-~tiXi <~ t3, 
icA3 
(6) 
xi E {0, 1}, i E A3 C H, l 3 < 270, u E R~, 
ci <_pi_<di, iEA3  cH,  
EP i>qa p3<q3 qaER~,  
lEA3 
and linear and bilinear constraints. The well-known technique of the columns generation [12] 
and methods of solving mathematical programming problems with mixed variables and linear 
constraints [t3] can be used as auxiliary ones in developing methods for solving this problem. 
Certainly, the problem of a similar kind can be formulated in the case in which both the values 
of p~ and ti are not known, whereas the inequalities of the kind (4) hold for both parameters. 
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Another approach to allocating resources available to a U.S. Presidential candidate for cam- 
paigning in states and DC is associated with employing ame theory [5]. When only the allocation 
of the monetary resource needs to be analyzed, which may take place, for instance, at early stages 
of the election campaign, an approach to modelling the allocation problem as a zero-sum two- 
person game proposed in [14] can be employed. 
Let us assume that only two U.S. Presidential candidates can win the electoral votes in the 
election, and let [5] 
r~, s~ be possible allocations of the resource in place i that can be chosen by Candidate 1 and 
Candidate 2, respectively, ri E 1,ni,Si E 1, m~, mi, ni E N, i  E A3, and 
e i be the election outcome for, say, Candidate 1, which is the gain of the electoral votes in 
place i once Candidate 1 chooses allocation ri E 1, n~ while Candidate 2 chooses allocation 
si E 1, rn~. 
Further, let e ~ be equal to the number of the electoral votes that place i appoints in the "giSi 
election if the number of "swing" votes to be received by (the electors of) Candidate 1 in place 
i exceeds that constituting 50 - ai percents of the voter turnout in place i, where ai is the 
percentage of the voter turnout in place i loyal to Candidate 1, and be equal to 0, otherwise. As 
shown in [14], an approach to evaluating the amounts of the resource necessary for winning the 
electoral votes equaling the numbers i e~ can be developed with the use of the functions fi(r, s) 
of r and s--where r and s are amounts of money spent by Candidate 1 and by Candidate 2, 
respectively, for campaigning in place/--describing the number of "swing" voters who will (are 
expected to) vote in favor of (the electors of) Candidate 1 in place i [5,14]. For the sake of 
simplicity, here and throughout the article, it is understood that "swing" voters are those U.S. 
citizens who will vote in the election although they are not loyal in advance to any of U.S. 
Presidential candidates that are in the race. 
Let hi, b2 E R 1 be total amounts of the resource available to the candidates for campaigning. 
Then the allocation of the resource for Candidate 1 can be found by solving the problem 
(x*, y*) E Arg max m~n (x, Qy}, 
(p,x) < bl, (q,y) < b2, 
where Q is a block-diagonal matrix whose blocks are formed by the matrices 
Ei i = (er~s.~) , r~ E 1,hi, s~ E 1,m~, mi ,n i  E N, i E 1,51, 
the vectors 
ni 
E Xij ~ --~ 1~ 
j i= l  
mi 
Z Yik~ = 1, 
k~=l 
51 n, 51 ?TZ" 
xER z~=I ~, yER ~=1 ~, 
iE '1,51,  xij.~ >0,  i E1 ,51 ,  j i  E 1,hi, 
i E  1,51, Yik~_>O, i E  1,51, h ie  1,m~, 
and the vectors 
p~__~ ((p~, . ,Plnl ) .. (p51, 51 • " ," , " '  • ,P~s i ) ) ,  
q 
. . . . .  q~l) , . . . ,  (q~l, 51 
• 
are those of expenditures associated with choosing variants of allocating the resource by the 
is the amount of money associated with variant candidates in each of the 51 places so that pj~ 
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j i of allocating the resource by Candidate 1 in place i, whereas q~, is the amount of money 
associated with variant ki of allocating the resource by Candidate 2 in place i. Necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the equilibrium strategies in the corresponding ames were developed 
by the author in [15,161, and for solvable games, equilibrium strategies are found as solutions to 
a certain dual pair of linear programming problem. One should, however, notice that the use 
of the described approach to allocating the monetary resource seems to be limited in practical 
calculations unless the game has a solution in pure strategies. 
The game-theoretic approach turns out to be fruitful for analyzing more complicated situations 
in allocating resources in U.S. Presidential elections. One of such situations, considered in the 
book [5], appears when only two candidates really compete for the electoral votes, and only one 
resource (money) is to be allocated. 
Let IAa~l = k, and for the sake of simplicity, let A~ = 1, k. Further, let M c Rk,t2 C R k be 
polyhedra of possible allocations of the resource among the places from A3 i by Candidate 1 and 
Candidate 2, respectively, so that M = {x E R~_ : Ax _< /~} , f~ = {y E R~_ : /)x _< d}, and 
x = (x l ,  x2 , . . . ,  y = (y l ,  y2 , . . . ,  yk). 
If M and t2 are disjoint, which means that the candidates allocate available amounts of money 
among the places arbitrary, then the interaction between the two candidates can be studied by 
Candidate 1 as a noncooperative two-person game of the kind 
f (x ,y )  = min {(ei,x) -- (ei,y)} ---+ max, 
iE1,-~ xEM 
~(x,y) = min {(ei,y) - (e~,z)} ~ max, 
iE 1,"-k yEf~ 
where ei E R~_ is the vector all components of which equal 0, except for component i equaling 1, 
i E 1, k. Here, it is assumed that if Candidate i allocates a larger amount of the monetary resource 
in place i than does Candidate 2, chances of Candidate 1 to win the election in place i are higher 
than those of Candidate 2. This game is a particular case of a two-person game considered in [17], 
where a method for finding a Nash equilibrium point of the game was proposed by the author. 
The team of one of the candidates may, however, believe that in order to be competitive in the 
race, the resource should be allocated in a set of places A3 i in such a manner that the inequalities 
xi Yi > "7~, i E A 1 R~+, - -  - -  3, "Ti E 
or  
x~_>0iyi, iEA  i3, 0iER~_, 
along with the inequalities 
hold. As in [5], xi,yi are amounts of money to be spent by the candidate and by his or her oppo- 
nent for campaigning in place i, respectively, and Ai corresponds to the information "threshold" 
beyond which the information contained in the advertisements related to the candidate is not 
absorbed by U.S. voters residing in place i. In this case, the game 
f (x ,  y) : rain {(e~, x) - (e~, y)} ~ max, 
iE1,--k xEM 
~(x, y) = max {(e~, x) -- (ei, y)} ---+ min, 
iE 1,-~ yE~ 
is reasonable to consider by the candidate's team. 
As 
max - y>} = - mi__n {<e.  y> - 
iEl,k iEl,k 
for any x E M, y E g~, and taking into account that 
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for any x E M, one can conclude that the equilibrium strategies in the game under consideration 
can be found as solutions to the auxiliary game problem 
LetxEM,  yE f~,and  
f (x,  y) = min {(ei, x} - (ei, y}} -~ max, 
iE 1,""k xEM 
~(x,y) = mi_n_n { (ei,y ) - (ei,x)} --~ max. 
iEl,k yE~ 
Px+Qy<l ,  
so that the players' strategies turn out to be connected. Then a set of equilibrium points in the 
set 
S= {(x,y)E R~_k: Ax + By > d}, 
where 
namely, 
(o ( A= , B= , d= , 
Ep(~,y)es={(x*,y*)eS : f (x,y*)< f (x*,y*), ~(x* ,y )<~(x* ,y* ) ,  (x ,y* )cS ,  (x* ,y)ES} (7) 
should be considered, and the problem of finding 
(x*,y*) E Ep(~,y)eS 
is to be solved. 
Another manner in which the opponent may counteract the candidate in the case under con- 
sideration is associated with considering the game 
f (x ,y)  = rain {(e~,x} - (ei,y) } ~ max, 
iE 1,'-k xEM 
~(x, y) = rain (ei, y) ~ max, 
iEl,k yE~ 
on the set S. 
This game is, of course, a particular case of the just considered game on a polyhedral set of 
connected strategies. 
If a Nash equilibrium point in these games is understood in the sense of definition (7), an 
approach to solving both problems on a polyhedral set of connected strategies can be developed 
based on the technique proposed by the author in [17] for solving similar problems on disjoint 
polyhedral sets and the idea proposed in [18] for solving certain classes of games on polyhedral 
sets of connected strategies. 
It is important to notice that the allocation of both time and monetary resources can be found 
in the framework of this approach to modelling the interaction between the two candidates. 
3. PROBLEMS OF  EVALUATING THE 
PROBABIL ITY  OF  WINNING THE ELECTORAL 
VOTES IN  A SET  OF  THE PLACES 
Although the candidate's advisers and strategists may use expert estimates of the amounts of 
money and time (p~ and ti, i E Aa) sufficient o succeed in each of places from the set Aa, it 
seems more cautious to consider that winning the electoral votes in places from the set A3 may 
occur only with certain probabilities. 
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Indeed, the candidate's competitors in a U.S. Presidential election may run their campaigns 
in a part or in all of the same places from the set Aa, which may, eventually, make results of 
employing any campaign strategies of the candidate unpredictable. Moreover, each candidate 
may have its own understanding of which places form the set Aa for him or her in the election, 
and this vision may not necessarily coincide with that of the other candidates. 
As mentioned in the book [5], for each amount of money sufficient for winning the necessary 
number of the electoral votes in at least one combination of places from the set A3, the maximal 
probability to win this necessary number of the electoral votes from places forming the set A3 
can be calculated. Moreover, increasing the amount of money to be spent for campaigning in the 
places is reasonable only by the amount hat secures increasing this maximal (for the currently 
available amount of money) probability of winning the necessary number of the electoral votes. 
Depending on what amount of money is or can be made available to the candidate for campaigning 
in places from the set Aa and what probability of winning the necessary number of the electoral 
votes is considered acceptable by the candidate's team, the decision on investing the money in 
winning the electoral votes in particular places from the set A3 should be made. 
There are two basic problems to be considered by the candidate's team [5]: 
(a) in which collection of places fi'om the set Aa should one invest the amount of money 
available for the campaigning (in places from the set A3) in order to attain the largest 
possible (for this amount of money) probability of winning the necessary number of the 
electoral votes by the candidate, and 
(b) what is the maximal possible probability with which the candidate can secure the winning 
of the necessary number of the electoral votes by campaigning in places from the set A3, 
and what amount of money is necessary to spend for the campaigning in order to attain 
this probability? 
PROBLEM (a). Let qi be the probability of winning all the electoral votes in place i, i E Aa by 
the candidate if p~ and ti are amounts of the resources allocated in this place. Let us also assume 
that the system of inequalities (5) is compatible. 
For each feasible solution x* = (x~ ... x~a) of system (5), we consider the event B(x*) consisting 
of winning all the electoral votes only in the places i E Aa for which x* = 1 in this solution. Then 
the probability of the event B(x*), P(B(x*)), equals the product of w a numbers (w a = IAa]), and 
for each i C Aa, such that x~' = 1, this number in the product equals qi (0 < qi < 1 as i E Aa), 
whereas for each i E A3, such that x* = 0, this nmnber in the product should be taken equal 
to 1 (which means that the corresponding probability to lose all the electoral votes in this place 
equals 1). Here, we assume that the winning of the electoral votes in each of the places occurs 
independently of that in other places from the set A3 [5] and that the winning of the electoral 
votes in place i in which the candidate does not campaign is the impossible vent. 
For any particular p3 and t a for which system (5) is compatible, finding the most reasonable 
allocation of the money and time is then reducible to solving the problem 
E a~x~ >_ la, 
icA3 
E PiXi ~ p3, 
iEAa 
E tixi <_ t 3, 
iEAa 
x~ + y¢ = t, i E A3 C H, 
xi,y~ C {0, 1}, i ~ A3 C H, l a < 270, 
I t  + >] ma , 
iEAa 
(s) 
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which is a nonlinear Boolean programming problem. Ideas of approaches to solving discrete 
optimization problems can be found, in particular, in [16,19], whereas oftware for solving this 
problem can be designed based on these approaches and with the use of the corresponding ex- 
perimental software information of which is available on the Internet. 
PROBLEM (b). It is easy to be certain that, generally, campaigning in all the places from the set 
Aa (if the available monetary and time resources allow the candidate to do it) secures a larger 
probability of winning at least l a electoral votes in these places than in any subset of the set Aa 
(if, of course, the probability to win in each place from the set Aa cannot be increased on account 
of spending more money and time for campaigning there). Correspondingly, the required amount 
of money equals ~ieA3 Pi assuming that spending the amount of money equal to Pi in place i, 
i E A3 secures the winning of the electoral votes there with the maximal probability. 
One of key elements to the reliability of solutions to both Problems (a) and (b) is a manner in 
which the probabilities qi, i E A3 are evaluated. 
There are two approaches to calculating these probabilities. The first one implies that the 
probabilities are assigned by certain experts so that the candidate's team takes for granted 
that winning the electoral votes in a particular place from the set Aa occurs with one and the 
same (average) probability as long as the necessary amounts of money and time are spent for 
campaigning in this place in the course of the candidate's campaign. Moreover, it is assumed 
that, in particular, for any less amount of money available for campaigning in this place, the 
place is lost for the candidate, whereas pending more money for campaigning in this place does 
not increase the probability of winning the electoral votes there [5]. 
The second approach assumes that the probability to win the electoral votes in a particular 
place from the set Aa depends on the amounts of the spent resources in a different manner 
and, generally, increases as do these amounts. Unlike in the first approach, certain regularities 
describing how the probability to win the electoral votes in each place depends, in particular, on 
the money spent for campaigning in this place are used. (As mentioned in [5], this probability, 
generally, increases as does the amount of money; however, a particular form of the corresponding 
regularities may vary for each place.) 
In the framework of the second approach, it turns out that for each place, there exists a certain 
information "threshold" after which the expectation of the number of voters who will cast their 
ballots in favor of (the electors of) a particular U.S. Presidential candidate does not increase. 
This "threshold" determines amounts of both resources, such that it is unreasonable to exceed 
these amounts in campaigning in the place, whereas pending, for instance, any lesser amount of 
money than the one determined by this "threshold" still may secure the value of the expectation 
of the voters acceptable to the candidate's team. 
For instance, it may be the case if more than two candidates are on the bailot in a particular 
place, and winning a plurality rather than a majority of the popular vote in this place is expected 
(by the candidate's team) to be sufficient for winning all the electoral votes in the place. It is also 
important to notice that the existence of the "threshold" in each place suggests that the amount 
of money that is reasonable to raise for campaigning there can be evaluated [5]. 
We now proceed to describing the second approach to calculating the probabilities qi, i E A3 C 
H, which, in fact, is a customization of a general approach to calculating these probabilities 
embedded in the scheme of planning advertising campaigns of goods and services by a firm; the 
latter was proposed by the author in [20]. 
In the course of U.S. Presidential election campaigns, the candidates try to "sell" their pro- 
grams, personM qualities, and past achievements to U.S. voters each of which may either buy one 
(or even all) of such products (associated with one of the candidates) or refuse buying any of them 
by either not participating in a particular U.S. Presidential election or by deliberately casting 
the ballot which cannot be recognized as a vote (for instance, by voting in favor of more than 
one candidate or by casting blank ballots). As shown in [20], one can consider the expectation 
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of the number of people in a region among the targeted population who will buy the advertised 
product as a function of the resources to be spent for advertising the product. 
In conformity to the election campaign, the targeted population in each state and DC is the 
set of swing voters there (see earlier in Section 2 of this article), and available resources are to 
be split among various kinds of advertisements that are placed via TV, radio, meetings, printing 
materials, etc. (Here, it is natural to include travelling expenses in those associated with certain 
kinds of the advertisements, for instance, meetings and rallies, requiring personal participation 
of the candidates.) Proceeding from results presented in [20], the expectation of the number of 
voters who will vote in favor of a particular U.S. Presidential candidate in place i E A3 on the 
election day can be written as follows: 
i i M'(T ') = f '  if1, 
=E ~,  1 -  1-I (1 -~}(z}) )  
× 1 -  E t~, 1- H (1-~b}(z})) Ct~,t 
ki=l j cH~ 
(9) 
and, as shown in [21], 
i i 2 '~ --I I 
z 1 -  I-I • ., ~,) = Mi (T  ~) = ~i 
ki=l L jEH~i 
(1 -  ~} (z}))] . (10) 
Variables zik~, k i E 1, n i describing volumes of advertising messages of kind k i that can be dis- 
tributed by the candidate are subject o the constraints 
n i 
E i z i < iEAa ,  Ckl kl _ "y~ 
i i< i  k i CklZki  -- ~k i ,  ~ 1, rti" 
(ii) 
Here, 
is the number of kinds of advertisements which can be used by a particular U.S. Presi- 
dential candidate in principle in the framework of campaigning in place i, i C A3; 
c~ is the cost of the unit of the volume of the advertising message of kind k i in place i; 
7 i k~ are limits on expenditures for advertisements of kind k i in place i; i E A3; 
7 i is the limit on expenditures for the entire campaign in place i, i E A3; 
H~ is a set of kinds of advertisements forming variant k i of interacting with advertisements 
that the voter may have in the course of the campaign conducted by the candidate in 
place i, k i E 1, 2 ~'~ - 1, i E A3; 
~i is the probability of the event consisting of the interaction of a voter from place i with k ~ 
combination (variant) k ~ of kinds of advertisements k ~E 1, 2 n~ - 1 in place i, i E A3; 
~ is the number of undecided voters in place i, i E A3; 
T i is the number of "swing" voters from place i who are expected to vote in favor of the 
candidate as a result of the campaign in place i, i C A3; 
CL stands for the binomial coefficient (~t ~) 
As discussed in [20,21] the function i , ~j (z~) is a monotone, nondecreasing function of z~, and 
constant for z} _> ~, where 2~ is the above-mentioned "threshold" of volume of the absorbable 
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information attributed to advertisements of kind j in place i. This function describes the proba- 
bility of the event consisting of arising intention in a voter in place/--who got information on the 
candidate from the advertisements and interacted with them according to variant k i C 1, 2 ~' - 1 
in place/- -to vote in favor of the candidate on account of advertisements of kind j. Here, it is 
assumed that particular values of all the parameters are either assigned by corresponding experts 
or are calculated using corresponding questionnaires and standard statistical methods [20]. 
Thus, by solving the problem 
i . Z i f~ (z~,z2,"  , n~) ~ max 
(z~,~ ...... ~)e~  
where gt ' is the set of feasible solutions to (11) for place i, one can evaluate the number of "swing" 
voters who are likely to vote in favor of the candidate in place i and evaluate the probability 
of receiving a plurality of the popular vote in the place using corresponding probabilistic tech- 
niques [22], along with the estimates of the number of voters who are expected to vote in favor of 
the candidate anyway. It is also clear that depending on the number of the popular votes to be 
received in the place in addition to the guaranteed one (to be received from the voters loyal to 
the candidate) and using the proposed approach, one can find, for instance, the amount of money 
to be spent for campaigning in the place in order to secure the winning of all the electoral votes 
there (assuming that it is possible in principle). Namely, proceeding from the needed number of 
"swing" voters ~di in place i E A3, one should form the following system of constraints: 
4,..., 4,) -> 
0_<z~<~j,  j E l ,n  i, 
(12) 
and solve the problem 
n i 
cjzj ---+ min 
j= l  
under the system of constraints (11),(12). (Here, it is assumed that 
(13) 
i ^ i  ^ i  7r ~ _< f (z t ,z2, - - - ,P ; )  (14) 
so that system (12) is compatible; the verification of its compatibility for a particular 7C d~ and 
the "correction" of 7r d~ in a certain natural sense can be done using methods proposed by the 
author in [23,24].) 
It is obvious that for each place i from A3 there exists and can be evaluated 7rmin,d~ the minimal 
number of undecided voters that must be persuaded to vote in favor of a particular candidate 
in order to secure the receiving of a plurality of the popular vote for the candidate there. So by 
solving problem (12)-(14) for place i, one can find the minimal amount of money to be spent in 
place i in order to win all the electoral votes there, along with the estimate of the probability qi 
of this event, after which problem (8) can be solved. 
One should notice that in the framework of the approach to planning advertising campaigns of 
goods and services proposed in [20], it is assumed that a potential buyer can buy the advertised 
product in one of particular locations in the region. In conformity to U.S. Presidential elections, 
it seems reasonable to consider that the interaction of a U.S. voter residing in place i with 
advertisements relevant o the candidate's campaign takes place within the county of residence, 
statewide, and nationwide. Corresponding generalizations of the problem (12)-(14) can be easily 
done using the formulae presented in [20]. 
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4. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CAMPAIGNING 
FOR RECEIV ING GENERAL ELECT ION GRANTS 
While candidates of major political parties are trying to win at least 270 electoral votes sufficient 
for winning a U.S. Presidential election (in which 270 is the minimal majority of all the electoral 
votes that are in play in the election), candidates of nonmajor parties participating in the election 
usually concentrate on winning the eligibility for the so-called general election grants to be used 
in the next U.S. Presidential election [5]. 
As is known, not a major party is eligible for receiving the general election grant in the coming 
election if its candidate received at least 5% of the popular vote in the previous election. So it is 
the popular vote that is the most important issue for a U.S. Presidential candidate from such a 
party for the purpose of receiving the general election grant, and the more total (popular) votes 
this candidate receives despite their distribution among the 51 places, the better. 
Let us assume that the amount of money available to the candidate in the election campaign 
is sufficient for both collecting the necessary number of signatures in order to be on the ballot (if 
the party is not recognized in any particular places appointing the electors) in some (or in all the) 
50 states and DC and campaigning for the required 5% of the nationwide popular vote. Then 
the problem of allocating the monetary resource among the states and DC in order to receive at 
least 5% of the nationwide popular vote can be written as the following nonlinear programming 
iEFcH 
problem: 
m3x 
(15) 
iEFcH k"=l 
where 
3' is the amount of money available to the candidate for only campaigning in the election 
year, 
F C H is the set of places in which the campaign will be conducted, and 
f~i is the set of solutions to system (11) for place i, 
and additional inear constraints of the balance kind with respect o all the variables or with 
respect o any group of them can be imposed. 
5. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH WINNING THE 
U .S .  PRES IDENCY V IA  THE U .S .  CONGRESS 
As mentioned in [1,5], when a U.S. Presidential candidate (the candidate further in this section 
of the article) does not have a chance to win a U.S. Presidential election via the Electoral College, 
this candidate may, eventually, decide to try to do it via the U.S. Congress. In order to succeed 
in throwing the election into the U.S. Congress, the candidate must 
(a) not let other U.S. Presidential candidates win a majority of the electoral votes that are in 
play in the election, and 
(b) make it on the list of the three persons (voted for as President in the Electoral College) 
among whom the House of Representatives will chose the President. 
As in [5], it is further assumed that the interpretation of the corresponding provisions from 
Amendment 12 of the U.S. Constitution is as such that three persons (rather than not more than 
three) will always participate in electing a U.S. President in the House of Representatives once 
the election has been thrown into the U.S. Congress, and at least three persons have received the 
electoral votes as a result of counting the electoral votes in January that follows the election year. 
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, it is further assumed that all the electoral votes in each of 
the states of Maine and Nebraska re won by one of the leading U.S. Presidential candidates. 
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In order to be successful in such a pursuit, the candidate should find the allocation of the 
monetary and time resources available to him or to her by solving the Boolean programming 
problem [5] 
(p~xi + qiYi) ~ min, 
lEA3 
Z aixi <_ 71, 
lEA3 
aiyi _< 72, (16) 
iEA3 
x~ ÷y~ = 1, i E A3, 
x~, yi E {0, 1}, i e A3. 
where 
xi equals 1 if leading Candidate 1 wins all the electoral votes in place i, and equals 0, 
otherwise, i c A3 c H, 
ai is the number of the electoral votes governed by place i in the election year, i E A3 C H, 
Yi equals 1 if leading Candidate 2 wins all the electoral votes in place i, and equals 0, 
otherwise, i C A3 C H, 
p~ is the cost to secure the victory of leading Candidate 1 in place i, i E A3 C H (to be paid 
by the candidate), 
qi is the cost to secure the victory of leading Candidate 2 in place i, i E A3 C H (to be paid 
by the candidate), 
71 is such a number of the electoral votes that the winning of this number of the electoral 
votes by leading Candidate 1 in places from the set of places A3 still does not allow this 
candidate to win the election via the Electoral College, whereas the winning of 71 + 1 
electoral votes in these places does, and 
72 is such a number of the electoral votes that the winning of this number of the electoral 
votes by leading Candidate 2 in places from the set of places A3 still does not allow this 
candidate to win the election via the Electoral College, whereas the winning of 72 ÷ 1 
electoral votes in these places does. 
Here, it is also assumed that the inequality 
max (71 ÷ l, 72 ÷ 1) ~ ~ a i 
iEA3 
holds, and that all the electoral votes can be won by only the candidate, leading Candidate 1, 
and leading Candidate 2. 
It is easy to conclude that the equality 
~-~a i ÷ G = 71 Jr 72, 
lEA3 
where a is the number of the electoral votes to be won by the candidate, holds. 
Certainly, if a -- 0, then all the electoral votes are to be divided only between the two leading 
candidates. If u and v are the numbers of the electoral votes to be won by the leading candidates 
in places loyal to them, respectively, then 
U ÷ 71 : 269, 
v ÷ 72 -- 269, 
and 
so that 
u + v + ~ ai = 538, 
lEA3 
71÷72 -'~ ~ ai~ 
iEAa 
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which reflects the fact that the winning of 71 and 72 electoral votes by the leading candidates, 
respectively, results in the electoral tie in the election. 
Let us now assume that only one of the leading candidates can win the election via the Electoral 
College. It means that, for instance, 
u + 71 = 269, 
whereas 
Then 
whereas 
v + ~ ai <_ 268. 
icA3 
u+v+a+ Eai=538' 
iEA3 
u+v+ Ea i+7]  ~537, 
icAa 
which means that 71 < a. It also means that if only one of the two leading candidates can win 
the election via the Electoral College by winning the electoral votes from places forming the set 
A3, then only one of the two inequalities 
E aixi ~ 71~ 
i@A3 
E aiy~ < 72, 
icA3 
should be present in the system (16). 
Let us now assume that besides the candidate and the two leading candidates, other k U.S. 
Presidential candidates have chances to win the electoral votes. Further, let us assume that, for 
instance, only these k candidates have a chance to win the electoral votes in places forming the 
be the cost to be paid by the candidate in order to secure the victory of set B3 c A3. Let sj 
candidate A in place j, governing bj electoral votes, A C 1, k, j E B3. Then in order to succeed 
in his or her pursuit to win the election via the U.S. Congress, the candidate should allocate 
the monetary resource available to him or her proceeding from the solution to, for instance, the 
following Boolean programming problem 
k 
E (pixi+q~yi)+ E E s~z~---~ min, 
i~A3\Ba A=I jEB3 
E aixi ~ 71~ 
iEAs\Ba 
E aiyi < 72, 
iEA3\B3 
x~ + Yi = 1, i • A3 \ B3, 
k 
4 : 1, J • a ,  
N=l 
jcB3 
x~, y~ • {0, 1}, i E Aa, 
z~' • {0,1}, j • B3, ), e 1,k, 
where z~ equals 1 if place j is included in the combination of the places and equals 0, otherwise, 
j • B3, X • 1, k, and it is assumed that this problem is solvable. 
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Certainly, this problem can be modified in order 
(a) to not let the other k candidates win as many electoral votes as would be sufficient for 
winning the election via the Electoral College by at least one of the leading candidates if
these electoral votes are transferred to such a leading candidate, and 
(b) to allow the leading candidates to win the electoral votes in places from the set B3 as well. 
In addition to that, various relations between the numbers ~/1, ~/2, bj, j C Ba, and ~r can be 
analyzed in just the same way it was done for the system (16). If, however, the candidate fails 
to win w2 > col electoral votes, where ~ol is the number of the electoral votes won by the other 
k candidates combined, then only negotiations of the candidate with these k other candidates 
may give the candidate a chance to make it on the list of those to be considered by the House of 
Representatives in electing a U.S. President in the U.S. Congress. As mentioned in the book [5], 
the mathematical nalysis of such negotiations can be done in the framework of cooperative game 
theory, and examples of the corresponding analysis for three negotiating parties can be found, in 
particular, in [25]. 
6. CONCLUSIVE  REMARKS 
REMARK 1. Approaches to modelling and solving the problem of allocating monetary and time 
resources proposed in this article differ from those proposed, in particular, in two basic works in 
this field [2,3] in several important instances. 
First, the former give, in particular, practical tools for effectively solving this problem based 
on 
(a) expert evaluations of the amounts of money and time to be spent for campaigning in each 
place fl'om the set Aa in order to receive all the necessary electoral votes there, and 
(b) widely available software for solving optimization problems. 
As mentioned in [5], although these evaluations may not necessarily be in line with certain the- 
oretical considerations, it should be understood that in the course of their campaigns, U.S. Presi- 
dentin candidates adopt only those decisions that are based on evaluations of close advisors whom 
they trust the most. It is then clear that providing such advisors with tools enabling them to 
quickly calculate results for various suppositions on the required amounts of the resources eems 
more valuable from practical viewpoint han, possibly, developing more accurate but cumbersome 
models and formulating problems based on such models as these problems may be difficult (if 
possible at all) to solve. 
Second, the assumption on the relation of the kind 
7Ci (ri, di) - ri 
ri +d i '  
where Iri(ri, di) is the probability with which a majority of uncommitted voters in place i will 
vote in favor of a U.S. Presidential candidate who spends ri amount of the resource (for instance, 
money) for campaigning there, whereas the candidate's opponent spends di amount of the same 
resource there seems rather simplified and serving mostly the convenience of the formal reasoning 
rather than reflecting the process of forming the intention to vote in favor of a particular U.S. 
Presidential candidate in uncommitted voters. It seems more reasonable to admit that, generally, 
the candidate who spends more money for campaigning in a place (state or DC) has, generally, 
a better chance to attract the voter's attention there; however, this chance can hardly be de- 
scribed by regularities of the above-mentioned kind. Moreover, such regularities do not reflect, 
in particular, the (apparently existing) "saturation" effect, when after passing a "threshold" of 
volume of advertising information aimed at "capturing" the voter (this volume depends on the 
amount of money spent for campaigning in a particular place), the voter simply does not absorb 
and process the advertised information and may, eventually, even change his or her mind on the 
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advertised product (features of the candidate's program and the candidate's qualities in the case 
of elections) [20,21]. The two-level scheme of allocating the resources in the framework of which 
(a) the available resources are first allocated in the "toss-up" places in such a manner that 
puts a candidate in a competitive position in each of the places in terms of exceeding (or 
being close to) amounts of the resources to be spent by the candidate's closest opponent 
for campaigning there comparing to those to be spent by the candidate, and 
(b) the most effective advertising campaign is then conducted in each place within these 
amounts 
seems to be reasonable from practical viewpoint. 
Third, the proposed approach allows one to work with maximal (in a certain sense) probabilities 
of winning pluralities of the statewide popular vote in each place that can be attained proceeding 
from a certain amount of resources to be spent for campaigning in the place. 
Fourth, the proposed approach also allows one to choose and analyze possible subsets of the 
"toss-up" places that may, eventually, turn out to be "victorious" for the candidate if the cam- 
paign conducted there transforms a chance to win into the victory in each of such places. 
REMARK 2. It may happen that the analysis of the candidate's potential to win the necessary 
number of the electoral voters in places from the set A3 (in order to win a particular U.S. Pres- 
idential election via the Electoral College) reveals that the candidate cannot win all the needed 
electoral votes by spending any amounts of the resources that could be spent for campaigning in
places from this set. In this situation, the only way to continue attempts to win the election via 
the Electoral College is associated with working out certain compromises with those candidates 
participating in the election who are on the ballot in places from the set A2 (for the candidate) 
but do not have a chance to win the election. (Certainly, it may become possible only if more 
than two candidates are on the ballot in at least those places from the set A2 that govern the 
number of the electoral votes combined that is sufficient for the election victory via the Electoral 
College for the considered candidate.) 
Constitutionally, in the framework of the existing Electoral College based U.S. Presidential 
elections ystem, two principal strategies can be employed by the candidate. 
In places from the set A2 in which the "winner-take-all" principle of awarding the electoral 
votes is in force and in DC (if it is considered belonging to the set A2), the candidate may 
negotiate with the other contestants there who do not have a chance to win the election. The 
idea of the negotiations i to arrange a serious of debates that may lead to reducing the threshold 
of pluralities of the popular vote in these places that may allow the candidate to win the election 
in the places governing the necessary amount on the electoral votes combined [1,5]. Certainly, 
exercising such a strategy implies spending additional resources for campaigning in places from 
the set A2 by the candidate and, at the same time, may interest hese other candidates only if 
certain promises are made by the candidate. 
The other strategy consists of trading the electoral votes that were won by the other candidates 
for certain political pledges to be made by the candidate to those candidates who agree to instruct 
their electors (if they can) to vote in favor of the candidate [5,8]. Although such a strategy has 
never been put to a test, formally, it cannot be ruled out, and precedents of a situation in which 
more than two U.S. Presidential candidates received the electoral votes are well known [8]. 
REMARK 3. The candidate may have a chance to substantially complicate the problem of allo- 
cating resources to the other participants of a particular U.S. Presidential election proceeding 
from perceptions of these other participants (U.S. Presidential candidates) on what places they 
consider as those belonging to their sets of places A1. Namely, for instance, the candidate may 
decide to campaign in some places from the set A1 considered by his or her major opponent as 
loyal ones and requiring particular amounts of the resources to be spent for campaigning there. 
Such an unexpected activity of the candidate may force the candidate's opponent o spend ad- 
ditional resources available to the him or her, especially if the candidate's chances to succeed 
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in these places will loom as real ones in the course of the campaign. Certainly, it will consume 
the candidate's resources likewise while, most likely, will not bring any electoral votes from these 
places in the end. So a reasonable balance should be kept in choosing this strategy in princi- 
ple, as well as in choosing particular places from the set A1 (for the candidate's opponent) for 
campaigning for the purpose of disorienting the opponent. The same reasoning is, obviously, 
applicable in considering more than one major opponent to the candidate. 
It is also obvious that under the "winner-take-all" principle of awarding the electoral votes, 
such a strategy does not imply that the candidate should necessarily try to win a plurality of the 
popular vote in any of the selected places from the set A1 (considered by the opponent as those 
loyal to him or her) in which the opponent has other (than the candidate) major opponents. 
Rather, pulling a certain number of the (popular) votes from the candidate's opponent may 
allow another election participant (among those who compete with the opponent in a particular 
place) to receive a plurality of the popular vote and, consequently, all the electoral votes from 
the corresponding place without causing any harm to the candidate in the Electoral College. 
It turns out that the evaluation of the amount of money (as well as other resources) to be spent 
by the candidate in order to exercise this strategy can be done in the framework of the approach 
to planning advertising campaigns developed by the author in [20] and mentioned in Section 3 of 
this article. Namely, one should proceed from the amount of money available for exercising this 
strategy and from the set of places in which the candidate has reasonable chances to receive a 
part of the statewide popular vote (which the opponent expects to receive) sufficient o either tip 
the scale in favor of another election participant in these places or at least to force the opponent 
to spend substantial amounts of money and time there. Then one should evaluate the numbers 
of targeted voters (who according to experts from the candidate's team could vote not in favor 
of the candidate's opponent) in each of the places. After that, the problem of maximizing the 
expectation of those voters among the targeted ones who are expected to cast their votes not in 
favor the candidate's opponent under the influence of the advertising campaign conducted by the 
candidate can be formulated as a problem of the kind (10),(11) [20,21] and solved for each place 
under consideration. 
Finally, the analysis of expected pluralities of the popular vote to be received by the opponent 
in each of the considered places under the influence of the candidate's campaign there should be 
done. If there exist places in which the opponent may lose winning a plurality of the popular vote 
as a result of the candidate's campaign there, the candidate's campaign should be conducted in 
as many such places as the available (for this purpose) amount of money allows the candidate 
to do it. If, however, the opponent preserves receiving pluralities of the popular vote in all the 
places under consideration, the problem of choosing a set of places from the set A1 (for the 
candidate's opponent) for running a disorienting campaign by the candidate (in order to force 
the opponent o spend larger amounts of the resources that could have been spent otherwise) 
should be formulated and solved. 
Let 
x~ be the amount of money to be spent by the candidate for campaigning in place i E A1 
(for the candidate's opponent) in the framework of a disorienting campaign against 
the candidate's opponent; 
ti be the amount of time to be spent by the candidate for campaigning in place i in the 
framework of the disorienting campaign against he candidate's opponent; 
y~ be the additional amount of money to be spent by the opponent in place i in order 
to counteract the candidate; 
si be the additional amount of time to be spent by the opponent in place i in order to 
counteract the candidate; 
q be the amount of money available to the candidate for exercising the strategy; 
p be the amount of money that the opponent can afford to spend counteracting the 
candidate in places f rom the set At; 
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ki, ai, #i, P~ be real numbers reflecting the relation between x~ and Yi in expressions of the kind 
y~ >_ k~xi + ai, and between t~ and si in expressions of the kind s~ > #~ti + Pi, i E A1. 
Further, let M = {x > 0 : Tx > 7}, and ~ = {y > 0 : Hy > 5} be polyhedra representing sets 
of allowable allocations of the amount of money among places from the set A1 under consideration 
for the candidate and for the opponent, respectively, where T, H are matrices with real elements, 
x = (x l ,x2 , . . . ,x .1) ,  y = (Yl,Y2,...,Y~I), ]All = wl, and %5 are vectors of corresponding 
dimensions components of which are calculated based on the numbers ai, Pi,P, q. Further, let the 
system of linear inequalities 
be formed by inequalities of the kind y~ > kixi -- ai and si > #~ti + p~, i E A1. Then the 
interaction between the candidate and the opponent in the framework of exercising a strategy of 
running disorienting campaigns by the candidate in places forming the set A1 (for the candidate's 
opponent) is reasonable to consider as a two-person game on a polyhedral set of connected 
strategies with the payoff unction 
f(x, y) = (~, y}, 
where c is the vector all the components ofwhich equal 1. In this game, the candidate is trying to 
force the opponent to spend as much money as possible for counteracting the candidate, whereas 
the opponent is trying to minimize this amount of money. Games of such a kind were considered 
by the author in [18], where a method for finding equilibria in the solvable games was proposed. 
REMARK 4. In all the considerations throughout the article, it was assmned that systems of linear 
inequalities representing constraints in all the mathematical programming and game problems 
are compatible, i.e., have feasible solutions. If, however, it is not the case in a particular problem, 
as mentioned earlier in Section 3 of the article, a simple "correcting" technique proposed by the 
author in [23,24] can be employed in order to find those changes in right hand sides of these 
systems that can be considered reasonable while leading to the existence of feasible solutions in 
the "corrected" system of the constraints. 
REMARK 5. In considering problems of allocating resources, it was assumed that raising addi- 
tional amounts of money and campaigning in particular places from the set H are separate tasks. 
However, it may happen that the candidate has to spend a certain amount of time campaigning 
in places loyal to him or her (in the sense of awarding all the electoral votes to him or her anyway; 
these places form the set A1 for the candidate), and by doing so, the candidate can also raise 
some additional money for campaigning in places from the set A3. Options of such a kind can be 
easily considered in the framework of mathematical models similar to those used in formulating 
problems considered in Section 2 of this article. 
Indeed, let 
aj be the amount of money that the candidate can raise by campaigning in place j, j E A1 
in the course of a particular segment of the campaign, 
yj be equal 1 if place j is included in a combination of places from the set A1 to be visited 
by the candidate in the course of the segment of the campaign, and be equal 0, otherwise, 
/~ be the amount of the monetary resource available to the candidate for campaigning in 
places from the set A1 in the framework of the segment of the campaign, and 
be the total amount of time available to the candidate for campaigning in places from the 
set A1 in the framework of the segment of the campaign. 
Then the problem of choosing places from the set of places A1 for campaigning and raising the 
money can be formulated, for instance, as the following Boolean programming problem: 
E Crj~lj ~ max, 
j cA1  
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E PJYJ ~-~' 
jEA1 
~ tJY5 <_t, 
jEA~ 
yj E {0, 1}, j c A1. 
This problem can be solved for each segment of the campaign in which raising the money for 
campaigning in the "toss-up" places is combined with campaigning in places loyal to the can- 
didate. (Here, it is assumed that pj ,t j , j  C A1 have the same sense as in problems (2)-(6) in 
Section 2 in conformity to the segment of the campaign under consideration.) 
REFERENCES 
1. A. Belenky, Extreme Outcomes of U.S. Presidential Elections: The Logic of Appearance, Examples, Ap- 
proaches to Eliminating, NISTRAMAN Consulting, Brookline, MA, (2003). 
2. S. Brams and M. Davis, The 3/2 Rule in presidential campaigning, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 68, 113-134, (1974). 
3. C. Colantoni, T. Leversque and P. Ordershook, Campaign resource allocations under the Electoral College, 
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 141-154, (1975). 
4. S. Brains and M. Davis, Comment on "Campaign resource allocations under the Electoral College", Amer. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 155-156~ (1975). 
5. A. Belenky, Winning the U.S. Presidency: Rules of the Game and Playing by the Rules, NISTRAMAN 
Consulting, Brookline, MA, (2004). 
6. W. KimberIing, The Electoral College, National Clearinghouse in the Election Administration Committee, 
Federal Election Committee, Washington DC, (1992). 
7. The Constitution of the United States of America-1787. United States Code 1, United States Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, (1989). 
8. W. Burns, Editor, After the People Vote: A Guide to the Electoral College, AEI Press, Washington, DC, 
(1992). 
9. E. Coffman, M. Garey and D. Johnson, An application of bin-packing to microprocessor scheduling, SIAM 
Journal of Computing 7, 1-17, (1973). 
10. S. Hartmann, Packing problems and project scheduling models: and integrating perspective, Journal of the 
Operational Research Society 51, t083-1092, (2000). 
11. R. Fourer, Linear programming. Software survey, OR/MS Today, August 1999, 64-71, (1999). 
12. T. Hu, Integer Programming and Network Flows, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 
(1970). 
13. G. Hadley, Nonlinear and Dynamic Programming, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, MA, 
(1964). 
14. W. Cook, M. Kirby and S. Mehndiratta, Models of the optimal allocation of funds over N constituencies 
during an election campaign, Public Choice, 20, 1-16, (1974). 
15. A. Belenky, Minimax planning problems with linear constraints and methods of their solutions, Automation 
and Remote Control 10, 1409-1419, (1981). 
16. A. Belenky, Operations Research in Transportation Systems: Ideas and Schemes of Optimization Methods 
for Strategic Planning and Operations Management, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, (1998). 
17. A. Belenky, A noncooperative game on polyhedral sets, Computers Math. Applic. 33 (1O), 125-133, (1997). 
18. A. Belenky, A two-person game on a polyhedral set of connected strategies, Computers Math. AppIic. 33 
(6), 99-125, (1997). 
19. G. Nemhauser, Integer and Combinatorial Optimization, John Wiley &~ Sons, New York, (1988). 
20. A. Belenky, An approach to planning an advertising campaign of goods and services~ Computers Math. 
Applic. 42, 993-1008, (2001). 
21. A. Belenky and I. Belenkii, Optimization of planning an advertising campaign of goods and services, Mathl. 
Comput. Modelling 35 (13), 1391-1403, (2002). 
22. A. Stuart, The Advanced Theory of Statistics, Hafner, New York, (1969). 
23. A. Belenky, A planning problem in a class of linear models, Automation and Remote Control 39 (11), 
1667-1673, (1978). 
24. A. Belenky, Analyzing the potential of a firm: An operations research approach, Mathl. Comput. Modelling 
35 (13), 1405-1424, (2002). 
25. R. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, John Wiley ~z Sons, New York, (1957). 
